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The burden of our claim here is that virtue in the city is to be found not so much in the 
abstractions and theorizing of higher philosophy but in “vulgar ethics,” Lewis C. Mainzer’s 
brilliant description of moral education in the classroom and street-level moral practices in the 
city’s departments and agencies (1991).  The hope of virtue in the city is to be found not just in 
the individual propensity to be virtuous but more so in the development of political and 
organizational rules and procedures, in virtuous leadership, and in the development of virtuous 
public cultures. 
We make these claims as a way to view what has come to be known as the Bell scandal.   
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The Bell scandal fits squarely in the traditions of the municipal reform movement, one of 
the most interesting and important narratives in the history of American political science and 
public administration.  Indeed, the Bell scandal and the other local government scandals in south 
Los Angeles in the early years of the twenty-first century, are echoes of widespread patterns of 
corruption in city government across the United States in the early twentieth century.  To put the 
Bell scandal in context and to ground our claims we first briefly review the municipal reform 
movement and then turn to the Bell and other scandals.  We then return to our claim that virtue in 
the city is most likely to be achieved through the application of vulgar ethics. 
Municipal Reform 
Among the many challenges facing the states in the newly established United States of 
America was how to govern cities.  Initially most of what we now call local government was 
accomplished through informal networks of community leaders who functioned according to 
informal rules and understandings (Warner, 1968).  Gradually, as cities grew and it became 
necessary to provide for some form of local government, the states simply made available  the 
model of government adopted by each of the states and by the United States—the balance of 
powers between the branches of government or the checks-and-balances model—with an elected 
executive, the mayor—; elected law makers, the city council, and a court, empowered to govern 
within particular geographic boundaries. The states also provided a form of local government for 
rural areas by dividing the state into counties. 
As American cities grew, so too did city problems—smoke, mud, dirty water, human and 
animal waste, epidemics.  The largest cities—New York, Boston, Baltimore—were also portals 
for waves of immigrants: the Irish, the Germans, the Jews, the Italians, the Scandinavians.  
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Larger East Coast cities rapidly became centers of commerce and industry, and by mid-century 
the industrial revolution was at full throttle.  In the dirt, noise, and chaos of the city it was clear 
that what was most urgently needed was order.  Cities established police departments, fire 
departments, schools, and public works departments to build roads, bridges, and street lights, to 
provide for order.  With municipal order came boss mayors with long incumbencies, machine 
politics to confound checks-and-balances, graft and bribery with contractors, and large politically 
powerful groups of city employees tied to the political machine.  Large city governments that 
were corrupt, lacking virtue, were simply given a particular label, a kind of corruption shorthand, 
depending on the city—Tammany Hall, Boss Tweed, the Pendergast Machine. 
The response to corruption in the city was the municipal reform movement, a significant 
part of the Progressive Era in American history.  Leaders of the Progressive Era included both 
Democrats—Woodrow Wilson,  Al Smith, William LaFollette—and Republicans—William 
Jennings  Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt, Robert Taft.  The wider progressive movement included 
women’s suffrage, prohibition, busting the banking and industrial trusts, public school 
improvement, self-improvement, and scientific rationality including scientific management.  At 
the center of the progressive era was a particular kind of popular journalism—muckraking—
valiant journalists exposing corruption and other dirty things, raking the much to get to the 
source of bad odor.  In many cities the progressive era was notably WASP (white Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant), and in other cities it was anti-immigrant, opposed to “the great unwashed.” Local 
advocates for good government came to be known as “goo-goos,” and municipal reform was 
advocated by leading civic groups and fraternal organizations.   It was not unusual to hear 
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Protestant pastors give sermons against the evils of city government corruption and to advocate 
reform (Flentje, 1993).     
The centerpiece of municipal reform came to be a new form of city government, known 
as  the council-manager plan, or the city manager plan.  Unlike the model of city government 
based on checks-and-balances between the executive (mayor) branch and the legislative (city 
council) branch of government, the model that was found in virtually all American cities at the 
end of the nineteenth century, the council-manager model called for a directly elected city 
council, preferably elected at-large rather than by district, and an appointed, professional, full-
time city manager rather than an elected mayor to be responsible for the executive branch of city 
government.   In the council-manager plan, the mayor is a member of the city council and 
exercises a primarily symbolic role as mayor, presiding at city council meetings, greeting visiting 
dignitaries, cutting ribbons.  The mayor is elected to the city council member and then is selected 
by the council to be the mayor.  The city manager appoints the heads of city departments, 
including the police and fire chiefs, and they report to him (In the early years of the council-
manager plan all city managers were male.  Today about twenty percent are female.).  Along 
with many other cities, Wichita, Kansas, adopted the council-manager plan in 1917.   Louis Ash 
was appointed to be the first city manager and in his statement to the press he said, “I believe in a 
clean city. . . . I will insist on an absolutely clean city. . . . I am a member of the Presbyterian 
Church and believe in the highest moral standards. . . . I will not let politics enter the city affair 
in any way” (Flentje, 1993.  36).  By the 1960s, about sixty percent of American cities with a 
population over 10,000 use council-manager form government.   
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But between the 1960s and the early years of the twenty-first century, almost all 
American cities had incrementally altered the details of their governments.  For example, more 
than 85 percent of council-manager form cities now elect their mayors directly, and many have 
given their mayors certain executive powers such as the veto.  All but a few council-manager 
form cities now elect council members by district.  Many of the features of council-manager 
form government are now found almost universally in mayor-council form city government:  
these include a merit-based civil service;  a city manager like official often designated the chief 
administrative officer and reporting to the mayor; strict budgeting, accounting, and auditing 
protocals; open meetings and records transparencies requirements.  As the details of city 
government structure have shifted and adapted over the past fifty years it is clear that the two 
models—the original mayor-council model and the reform council-manager plan—have come 
increasingly to resemble each other (Frederickson, Johnson, Wood, 2004).     
The municipal reform era resulted in a well-known list of agreed-upon assumptions, 
accepted standards, and preferred practices which, taken together, constituted the aspects of 
public administration ethics that have to do with cities.  Let us call this list the traditional 
municipal reform and public administration ethics canon, or simply the canon. The canon 
includes: 
 
 
 
Politics and Administration 
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• Clear lines between day-to-day professional city administration on one hand and city 
politics and political office holding and particularly electoral or campaign politics on 
the other 
•the understanding that appointed administrative officials do not meddle in politics and 
elected officials do not meddle in administration 
•Prohibitions against nepotism and cronyism  
Ethical Management 
•Merit-based appointment and promotion of the administrative staff as an alternative to 
political spoils 
•professionalization of city employees 
• Objective and transparent procurement and contracting procedures 
• Encouragement of and support for whistleblowers 
Ethics Standards and Requirements 
•Prohibition against conflicts of interest on the part of both elected and appointed 
officials 
•Fair and equal treatment of citizens 
• Formal adoption of ethics rules and both institutional and professional codes of ethics 
• Prohibitions against bribery  
•Ethics training 
 
 
•Prohibition against the use of public property or time for personal or political purposes 
7 
 
• NASPAA Commission on Peer Review and Accreditation requirement that MPA 
degrees curricula include ethics education 
Oversight and Accountability 
•Annual external auditing 
•Strong systems of state oversight 
There are, of course, many more things that could be included in the canon.  Taken 
altogether, full implementation of the municipal reform canon should result in clean, honest, 
uncorrupt city government.  The canon does not rely on the assumption that public officials will 
be good; indeed it assumes that canonical procedures and processes reduce the likelihood that 
public officials will be bad.  Not being angels, public officials may need help to be virtuous, 
hence the canon, a hedge against the frailty of human virtue.        
There are two “good-government” organizations that were and continue to be particularly 
influential in municipal reform, the National League of Cities with its “model city charter” and 
the International City-County Management Association and its advocacy of professional city 
administration (Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood, 2003).  Both organizations serve effectively 
as guardians of the canon of municipal reform. 
Did the municipal reform canon work? Did we find virtue in the city? Mostly yes.  As a 
result of the widespread adoption and implementation of most of the elements of the canon, by 
the 1960s American city government was far more honest and ethical than it had been at the 
beginning of the century.  This is particularly the case in the American suburbs, newer cities 
established just before and after the Second World War.  Almost all those cities chose the 
council-manager form of government and adopted the structures and procedures that would 
8 
 
enable the municipal reform canon. To be sure, the traditional ethics canon is vulgar, focusing as 
it does on what should not be done rather that what should be done.  The full application of the 
traditional ethics canon can slow government down, cause procedural red tape, and focus on 
small or petit ethics such at the misuse of computers, cars, expense accounts, and cell phones.   
The canon can leave big ethics issues such as goal displacement and the weakening of civil 
society untouched.  And difficult ethical issues such as what to do about poverty or the homeless 
were also left untouched (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996).  Nevertheless, the story of American 
local government in the last half of the twentieth century and the first few years of the twenty-
first century, is a narrative of good government.  That is why the Bell scandal and other 
somewhat similar scandals in south Los Angeles stand out. 
To ask again, by the 1960s had the widespread application of the traditional canon of 
public administration ethics helped the city to find virtue? Yes, but often in small things. It was, 
however, big events and big ethical issues that punctuated the 1960s—political assassinations, an 
unpopular war, urban riots. In the context of these and other large-scale events and movements, 
American public administration, however well it might have earlier contributed to ethical city 
politics and administration, seemed badly out of touch. As those associated with Minnowbrook 
and with the so-called new public administration claimed, the public administration of the 1960s 
seemed adrift and irrelevant to the important ethical issues of the day (Frederickson, 1980). 
Because cities were far less corrupt than they once were, beginning in the 1970s the 
emphasis in public administration ethics shifted from a focus on cities to a national and 
international institutional emphasis.  At about the same time the emphasis on public 
administration shifted from vulgar ethics to more reputable and elegant philosophical matters 
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(Denhart, 1988; Rohr, 1978; Rohr, 1998; Cooper, 2006).  By the end of the twentieth century, as 
the attention of the media, of academics, and of opinion leaders was directed elsewhere, 
problems of local government corruption began to reemerge, and in the southern suburbs of Los 
Angeles they reemerged with a vengeance. 
This brings us to the Bell scandal and to scandals in Bell’s neighboring cities.  
City Corruption in Southern California 
While cases of local public corruption in Southern California are not new, the number of 
cases and the severity of those cases in the past fifteen years is notable.  Corruption is now 
understood to be  an on-going problem (DePangher 2014).  According to the Illinois Integrity 
Initiative of the University of Illinois, Los Angeles is placed second – behind only Chicago - in 
federal public corruption convictions between 1976 and 2010 (Simpson, et al. 2014).  
The city of Bell is at the center of the current focus on municipal corruption in Southern 
California.  Bell is one of a contiguous cluster of smaller cities about five miles south of the 
center of Los Angeles, situated  between three major north-south traffic arteries: the Harbor 
Freeway, or the 110 on the west; the San Diego Freeway, or the 5; and the Long Beach Freeway 
,or the 710, on the east.  Bell’s contiguous sister cities include Vernon, Bell Gardens, Maywood, 
South Gate, Lynwood, Cudahy, and Santa Fe Springs.  All of the eight cities are 80 to 90 percent 
Hispanic.   It is estimated that just fewer than half of the residents of these cities are immigrants.   
All eight cities are poor: median family annual incomes range between $30.000 and $35,000, 
with  the rate of “families in poverty” between 20 and 25 percent of the residents.  
Taken together, Bell and her sister cities have a population of 310,000, three times the 
size of Burbank or Inglewood, twice the size of Pasadena, one third larger than Glendale, and 
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equal to the size of Riverside.  If Bell and her sister cities were one city it would be the 12th or 
13th largest city in California.  The boundaries of Bell and her sister cities encompass 33.5 square 
miles, with a population density of XXXX, making it the XXXX most dense area in greater Los 
Angeles. 
To put the Bell scandal in context, it is helpful to employ the classic social science 
methodology of broadening the scope of inquiry and lengthening the time of inquiry.  To do this 
we  briefly review cases of corruption in Bell’s sister cities in the south Los Angeles suburbs.  
Corruption in six of those cities—Bell Gardens, Lynwood, Vernon, Cudahy, Maywood, and 
Santa Fe Springs—while serious, did not rise to the level of hyper corruption that Bell 
experienced.  But one city did—South Gate.  We lengthen the time of inquiry by beginning in 
the year 2000, giving us 15 years of evidence.  After brief treatments of the 6 “less corrupt” sister 
cities, we focus the remainder of this chapter on “corruption on steroids” in South Gate and Bell.     
In 2001, Maria Chacon, an elected member of the city council of Bell Gardens (1961: 
44,000), engineered an appointment as city manager.  She “ran Bell Gardens like a Mexican 
cacigne, or political boss (Quinones, 2015).  She was convicted of violating conflict-of-interest 
laws. In 2006 and 2007, councilman Mario Beltran was convicted of filing false police reports 
and of violations of the Political Reform Act for failing to properly disclose campaign 
contributions (Castillo and Alvarez, 2010). Political reform groups have formed since these 
events, pressing for accessibility to easy to understand information for residents regarding city 
operations. 
In the City of Lynwood (1921: 20,000) in 2005 Mayor Paul Richards II was convicted of 
corruption charges for funneling $500,000 of city business to his family consulting company and  
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was sentenced to 16 years in prison. In 2007, five others were charged with siphoning hundreds 
of thousands of dollars to their personal benefit (Sewell and Garrision ,2012) In 2012, Louis 
Byrd and Fernando Pedroza were found guilty of illegally boosting their salaries, accepting 
stipends for sitting on city commissions that did little work (Sewell 2012).  They were also found 
guilty of misusing city credit cards and accepting stipends for having attended non-city related 
events. 
With 110 residents, Vernon (1905) may be the most unusual city in California and 
possibly in the United States.  On any given work day there are more than 40 thousand people 
working in warehouses and assembly and manufacturing plants in Vernon. The mayor and city 
council members all work for the city.  Leonis Malberg, the grandson of the founder of Vernon  
served as mayor for more than 50 years.  Elections are seldom held in Vernon because if there 
are no challengers, elections  can be cancelled. Mayor Malberg lives eight miles away in a six 
bedroom, six bath mansion in Hancock Park, which is about as high end as it gets in Los 
Angeles.  He lives in his second residence, his primary residence being a cot in his office in the 
Vernon city hall. 
In 2006 Bruce Malkenhorst Sr., one time city manager of Vernon, was convicted of 
misappropriating public funds. And Mayor Leonis Malburg was later found guilty of public 
corruption.  In 2010, the then city administrator Donal O’Callaghan, was indicted on felony 
counts of conflict of interest and misappropriation of funds.  Eric T. Fresch served for a time as 
Vernon city administrator and also as a legal consultant to the city, received fees in excess of  
million dollars a year for four years.  Malberg, O’Callahan, and Malkenhurst were all found 
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guilty of fraud.   Eric T. Fresch was found dead.  He drowned in the Pacific Ocean near San 
Francisco in June, 2012. 
In the City of Cudahy (1960; 25,000) Mayor David Silva, Councilman Osvaldo Conde 
and Code Enforcement Director Angel Perales were found guilty of bribery and extortion in 
2012.   
Maywood (1924; 28,000), faced with financial deficits in 2010, disbanded its police 
department, laid off virtually all city workers, and outsourced operations to the City of Bell.  In 
recent years, Maywood city operations, particularly police and fire, have been outsourced to the 
government of Los Angeles County, a not uncommon arrangement for smaller cities in Los 
Angeles County.  In the same year, the FBI investigated city council member Felipe Aguirre for 
receiving federal grants with a partner and receiving bribes from businesses (Becerra 2010).  It 
was while they were investigating alleged corruption in Maywood that Los Angeles Times 
reporters Jeff Gottlieb and Ruben Vives heard rumors of remarkably high salaries for both 
elected and appointed officials in neighboring Bell, the city to which Maywood had just 
outsourced its city operations.  Following that rumor they uncovered the much larger Bell 
scandal.  
In the city of Santa Fe Springs (1957: 17,500) city council member Joseph Serrano, Sr. 
was convicted of receiving bribes from an owner of a marijuana store in 2010 and 2011 (Sewell 
et al. 2012).  
 
We turn now to the South Gate (1928; 94,000) and Bell (1927;  36,000) scandals.  
Although our current concern is Bell, to consider the South Gate scandal alongside the Bell 
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scandal reveals points of difference and similarity.   Although the South Gate scandal occurred a 
decade earlier than the Bell scandal, the Bell scandal is a rather clear, albeit delayed, echo of the 
South Gate scandal. 
In 2001, city officials of the City of South Gate, city treasurer, Albert Robles, mayor 
Xochitl Ruvalcaba, vice mayor Raul Moriel, and city councilwoman Maria Benavides  formed a 
coalition that effectively controlled the city.  Led by Robles, this group gave themselves 
exorbitant pay increases and gave big pay increases to certain other city officals.  They approved 
of $4 million in federal loans and grants to their own business partners and they appointed 
Robles a deputy city manager so the city could cover his legal defense against felony charges.    
The city clerk informed the California secretary of state of allegations of corruption and election 
fraud (Marosi 2003).  Robles and other then cut the clerk’s salary by three-quarters in an attempt 
to silence her. City reserves, once $8 million, were reduce to $1 million.  In 2003, these four city 
officials were recalled by voters and in February 2003.  Albert Robles was convicted of bribery 
in 2005 and was later sentenced to 10 years in federal prison.  He was also ordered to pay 
$639,000 in restitution.  He is now free. 
With an undergraduate degree from the University of California at Berkeley, and a 
master’s degree in public administration from California State University, East Bay, after having 
been the assistant city manager of Rancho Cucamonga in the early 1980s, and then the first city 
manager of Hisperia, Robert Rizzo was hired in 1998 as the city manager of Bell, one of the 
poorest cities in Los Angeles County, in part because he was willing to take a comparatively low 
salary.  Not long thereafter, Rizzo, among others, put together a ballot initiative that would 
designate Bell a charter, or “home rule” city, thereby exempting city officials from state salary 
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limits.  It passed, 336 to 54, with fewer than 400 votes cast, less than 2 percent of registered 
voters.  Of the 336 votes in favor, 239 were cast by absentee voters.  In 2010, Jeff Gottlieb and 
Ruben Vives of the Los Angeles Times engaged in detailed investigative  reporting on what 
would come to be known as the Bell scandal.  The Los Angeles Times received the Pulitzer Prize 
for investigative reporting for the work of Gottlieb and Vives.  The reporting detailed exorbitant 
salaries, several large loans, greatly padded retirement accounts, shake-downs of local business 
owners, and a property tax rate higher than that of Beverly Hills.        
Follow-up reporting by The Times found that further examples of public fund allocations 
for personal enhancement was established.  In the fall of 2010, the then attorney general Jerry 
Brown filed a lawsuit against Bell city officials, and they were found guilty of misappropriation 
of public funds: Robert Rizzo former city manager (12 years, $9 million in restitution); Angela 
Spaccia, former assistant city manager (11, years 8 months, $8 million in restitution); former city 
councilmembers (George Mirabal, George Cole, Teresa Jacobo, Victor Bello, and mayor Orscar 
Hernandez) each received 1 year in jail (Cole received home confinement) and community 
service and restitution requirements. 
The California Board of Accountancy fined the audit firm Mayer Hoffman McCann 
$300,000, suspended their license, and placed them on probation for two years for failing to 
correctly audit the accounts of the City of Bell.  
Having briefly reviewed each of the eight cases—Bell and her sisters—we now turn to a 
consideration of these scandals, using the municipal reform canon described above as a 
framework. 
Politics and Administration 
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 The Bell scandal is, all by itself, an interesting, instructive, and disturbing case study of 
city corruption.  But in the language of the social sciences, the Bell scandal case study is an “N 
of one.”  However well crafted a case study may be, and the Gottlieb, Vives and colleagues 
reportage is very well crafted,  a single study is limited as a basis for generalizations about the 
subject at hand—local government corruption.   
 The Bell scandal is the story of an educated and seemingly qualified city manager, Robert 
Rizzo, and an assistant city manager, Angela Spaccia, corrupting all the members of the city 
council and others, looting the city treasury, shaking down businesses, paying themselves 
outrageous salaries and ballooning up their retirement accounts, and overtaxing the citizens.  A 
correct and true description of the Bell scandal leads the reader to a particular set of 
generalizations about local government corruption, and particularly about administrative 
corruption (Smoller, 2014). 
 Add to the story of scandal in Bell the story of Bell’s larger neighbor, South Gate, a 
remarkably similar scandal ten years earlier.  The villain in the South Gate scandal was Albert 
Robles, an educated, smooth talking, ambitious politician.  From 2000 to 2003, Robles was at 
various times either elected or appointed treasurer, mayor, deputy city manager, and council 
member of the City of South Gate.  Like Rizzo in Bell, Robles corrupted the South Gate city 
council, paid himself and others outrageous salaries, loaded up their retirement accounts, looted 
the city treasury, misappropriated public funds, and overtaxed the people (Quinones, 2007; 
Quinones 2015).  The South Gate case would seem to be primarily a narrative of political 
corruption.  The Bell case is primarily a narrative of administrative corruption.   
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 Add to the Bell and South Gate cases the examples of city corruption in the “Bell and her 
sister cities” cluster of cities in south Los Angeles, and one finds patterns of political (elected) 
official and administrative (appointed or civil service) corruption that fit widely agreed-upon 
generalizations about local government corruption.  Among Bell and her sisters, there were three 
elected officials convicted of corruption for every one administrative or civil service official 
convicted for corruption (deLeon, 2005; Henriques, 1986; Frederickson, 1997; Frederickson, 
2005; McGrath, 2013). 
   Much greater evidence of scandal is associated with elected 
       officials and political appointees than with the merit-based civil service. 
                        Yet the general public has seldom distinguished between the behavior of 
  political officials and civil servants; all the people see is corruption.  . . . 
  The evidence shows, however, that it is not primarily the bureaucrats who are 
  practicing fraud—it is the elected officials and their appointees 
  (Frederickson, 1997, p 165).  
 
  
 Using the Bell and her sisters cluster of cities and the 15 year span of time, starting in 
2000, it is instructive to consider this countefactual.  First, assume Bell and her sisters, rather 
than 8 cities are a single city, a city of 310,000, the size of Riverside.  Second, total the number 
of convictions for corruption in Bell and her sister cities between 2000 and 2015.  While the 
numbers may not be exact, there were approximately 30 convictions for scandal during this  
time.  It would be astonishing if there were 30 scandal convictions in Riverside between 2000 
and 2015, a rate of two convictions each year for 15 years—certainly an epidemic of corruption.  
It would, of course, have been just as astonishing if Bell and her sisters were a single jurisdiction.  
But because these scandals were scattered over 8 small cities and over a span of 15 years, what is 
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now understood to be an obvious epidemic of local government corruption was masked by 
jurisdictional fragmentation. 
 That there should be a line between politics and administration traces to Woodrow 
Wilson’s founding essay on public administration (1887).  Often referred to as the politics-
administration dichotomy, or the policy-administration dichotomy, Wilson’s conceptual line was 
and remains a key element of municipal reform.  In the early years of public administration it 
was argued that city administration should be clean, practiced by persons chosen on the basis of 
merit, expert professionals engaging  in the rational and orderly management of government 
affairs.  As set out in the earlier treatment of municipal reform, city administration should be 
protected from campaigns for political office, from political fund raising and the electoral 
process.  The practices of local politics should be protected from the influence of city empolyees.  
It has long been acknowledged that in reality there is no such line between politics and 
administration.  There is, instead, a rather gray space between the two, a space that can be 
narrow or wide depending on the issue.  Real or not, the line between politics and administration 
has been an enduring and useful trope in the ethical conduct of city governance. 
 In both the South Gate and the Bell cases the line between politics and administration 
was obliterated.  Albert Robles and his gang in South Gate crossed way over from politics into 
day-to-day city operations, because the city administration proved to be weak.  In Bell, Robert 
Rizzo and his administrative gang crossed way over the line from administration into politics by 
luring the elected city council into corruption with high salaries for part-time work.   Rob Zuel, 
the planning director in Hysperia during the period the Robert Rizzo served as the city manager, 
describes it this way: 
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 Rizzo had persuaded the rookie council members to let him manage as he saw 
            fit, even if it meant managing them as well, a pattern that Bell employees say would  
carry over to their city.  “They were sheep and he was the herder of the sheep,” (Pringle,    
Knoll and Murphy, 2010).  
 
 Should the administration of South Gate have been able to keep Albert Robles mostly on 
the political side of the line?  Should elected officials in Bell have been able to keep Robert 
Rizzo mostly on the administrative side of the line?  From the perspective of government ethics 
the answer should be yes.  After all, the line between politics and administration, however 
mythical it may be, works generally well most of the time in most cities in the United States.  
Professional city managers and their senior staff—the chiefs of police and fire, the public works 
directors, and, particularly, the directors of purchasing and contract management all know what 
the line between politics and administration is about.  And they should know what is required to 
keep the mayor or members of the city council from crossing that line.  Likewise, elected city 
officials and those running for city political offices are keenly alert to the slightest whiff of 
campaign support for their opponent coming from city employees.  Obviously, protection of this 
line in the cases of South Gate and Bell failed utterly.   
 The line between city politics and administration is rather different than the line between 
city policy and city administration.  In strictly formal terms, the power to set policy is in the 
hands of city elected officials; after all, in our system of democratic self-government, these 
officials represent the residents of the city.  The mayor and the city council make policy, approve 
city statutes and regulations, approve the budget, and set tax rates and expenditures.  What 
appears to be a wide range of mayoral and council power over city policy and finance is, 
however, rather tightly circumscribed by the layers of accumulated policy and finance decisions 
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inherited from previous mayors and councils.  City elected officials face multi-year bonds that 
must be paid, a city bureaucracy with certain job entitlements, infrastructure that must be 
maintained, and bills that must be paid just to keep the lights on. It is the city manager and the 
senior staff, the professional experts, who are the guardians of standing city polices and 
obligations, as well as the commitments of previous city leaders.  Because standing obligations 
leave little wiggle room for elected incumbents, they almost always make policy incrementally, 
taking small steps in one policy direction or another.  Budgets tend also to be incremental; this 
year’s budget is a very good predictor of next year’s budget.   The pattern of established stability 
and order has the virtue of predictability, but it has the vices of saddling incumbents with 
obligations, some of them boneheaded, made by their predecessors.  There could be no better 
example than the present crisis in funding public employee retirement in California. 
 In both the South Gate and the Bell corruption scandals the incremental pattern of public 
policy change broke down. In both cases the primary policy initiative, the bold new direction for 
the city, was to sharply increase the salaries of city leaders.  In South Gate big salary increases 
and retirement funding for Albert Robles and his gang were hidden (Quinones, 2007).  Likewise 
Robert Rizzo and his assistant tucked away in the folds of the Bell city financial accounts big 
salary and retirement increases for themselves and their gang.  These were not incremental 
policy changes.  They were big, bold, brazen policy changes.  The lines were obliterated between 
elected officials with contemporary preferences and city professional staff protecting standing 
policy and financial commitments.                         
Ethical Management  
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 If there is a universal act in the annals of city government corruption it would be the 
practice of political spoils, nepotism, or cronyism.  All three have to do with the provision of city 
employment for the wrong reasons.  The canon of municipal reform features the practice of city 
employment that is based on individual merit, merit being judged on the basis of training, 
education, experience, character references, and a clean legal record.  The implantation of an 
effective merit system is understood to be essential to ethical government.  If, in the first place, 
the right people are employed on the basis of a good merit system, the rest of the management 
ethics canon holds real promise for clean city government.  But if initial employment and 
subsequent promotion arre based on spoils, nepotism, or cronyism, it is very difficult to 
effectuate the remainder of ethics canon.   
 In his excellent treatment of the South Gate scandal, Sam Quinones writes: 
 The Robles council began firing department heads and replacing them with notably 
unqualified people.  These replacements received contracts unheard of in California city 
government. For example, South Gate agreed to pay eighteen months of each manager’s salary if 
he were fired, twelve month of his salary were he to quit.  To expedite matters, the council did 
away with written civil service exams.  People were hired based entirely on oral interviews 
(Quinones, 2007, p. 92). 
 
 A new, young, and inexperienced city manager was hired.  A new department was 
established with over 100 new employees, many of them just out of high school.  The mission of 
the new department was never made clear.  The brother of a member of the city council was 
appointed as one of the managers of this department.  The new department cost $3.2 million 
(Quinones, 2007). 
 A rotating cast of lawyers was employed, including one who had been disbarred for 
embezzlement and forgery.  Ordinarily South Gate spent about $500,000 per year on lawyers.  In 
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the first eighteen months of the Robles gang, spending on lawyers came in at $10.6 million.   
City employment jumped from about 360 to about 540 in that same period (Quinones, 2007). 
 In the absence of a merit system, many of the other elements of the “ethical management” 
part of the municipal reform canon were essentially inoperative in South Gate.  For example, 
during the Robles trial, “evidence showed that he had solicited $1.8 million in bribes from 
companies bidding on city contracts” (Quinones, 2007, p. 114).  
 A few years later in nearby Bell, the Rizzo gang was less interested in the details of 
management and the principles of management designed to prevent corruption and more 
interested  in designing the means by which to increase their salaries and to generate the revenue 
to cover the costs of those salaries (Esquivel and Lopez, 2010) 
          One principle of good city leadership is the professional development of the city staff.  
Albert Robles brought to South Gate a curious twist on professional development.  He was a 
devotee of the self-help guru Tony Robbins and a platinum level member of the Robbins 
Leadership Academy, which included fire walking and traveling to Fiji.  While at South Gate 
Robles enrolled the entire upper staff of the city in the Leadership Academy at the city’s expense 
(XXX).  At Bell Robert Rizzo showed little interest in personal training or professional 
development either for himself or his staff. 
 Rizzo’s real interests and skills were in finance.  While city manager of Hesperia he was 
noted for finding and developing new revenue sources,   “He was very impressive” said Howard 
Roth, “one of the Hesperia city council members who hired Rizzo.  None of us had ever started a 
city before and he seemed to know what he was talking about.  He scored points early by finding 
revenue opportunities” (Pringle, Knoll, and Murphy, 2010).  These same skills were on display 
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in his early years as city manager of Bell, where he “won praise from his elected bosses for 
righting the cash-starved city’s financial course by restructuring bonds that teetered on default 
and taking other measures to firm up the bottom line” (Pringle, Knoll, and Murphy, 2010). 
 There is no evidence of Robert Rizzo being active in professional organizations such as 
the International City/County Management Association (ICMA).  Nor is there evidence of Albert 
Robles being engaged in the activities of the League of California Municipalities or the National 
Civic League, the professional organizations for elected city officials.  These organizations are 
the primary means of conveying the principles, values, practices, and innovations of good city 
government.  Rizzo and Robles were outliers, essentially disconnected from their professions. 
 There appears to be one important exception to this generalization.  Robert Rizzo 
befriended Bruce Malkenhorst, Sr. who made more than $900.000 in 2005 as Vernon’s city 
administrator (Pringle, Knoll, and Murphy, 2010).  On occasion they golfed together.  It may be 
a coincidence that Malkenhorst and Rizzo were the two highest paid city administrators in 
California.  But in the same way that patterns of the “diffusion of innovation” spread “best 
practices” from city to city through the processes of strategic planning and bench-marking, it 
may be that the links between Malkenhorst and Rizzo are an example of the diffusion of “worst 
practices.”        
 The problem in both the South Gate and Bell cases was not the absence of management 
policies and procedures designed to prevent corruption; the problem was the ease with which 
these policies and procedures were ignored. 
Ethical Standards and Requirements  
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 Although the professional code of ethics of the International City/County Management 
Association is on the office wall of almost all city managers, and many cities have adopted their 
own code of ethics that elected leaders and city employees are expected to pledge to, there is no 
evidence of a knowledge of or interest in ethics on the part of Albert Robles or Robert Rizzo.   
There was no ethics training in South Gate or Bell during their periods in office. 
 Although usually a part of codes of ethics and ethics training, prohibitions against 
receiving or giving bribes in return for personal gain and prohibitions against conflicts of 
interest, are prominent features of state law.  The convictions of officials from Bell and her sister 
cities were for, among other things, bribery and conflicts of interest. 
Oversight and Accountability  
 South Gate and Bell are part of small suburbs of Los Angeles, towns overshadowed by 
the big city, places that attract little attention.  Press coverage of Bell and her sister’s was sporadic and 
shallow.  Published since 1928, the South Gate Press had been sold twice and could not make the 
transition from a primarily English speaking to a primary Spanish speaking readership.  “Television and 
radio never covered the politics of these towns.  La Opinion the nation’s largest Spanish daily, rarely sent 
reporters to the area.  The Los Angeles Times and the Long Beach Press-Telegram devoted only one 
reporter apiece to all the suburbs southeast of Los Angeles” (Quinones, 2007, p. 73).  In the absence of 
an investigative press, there was little public oversight of local political affairs, particularly in the short 
run.  It was not until there was an accumulation of the smaller details of corruption that the big Los 
Angeles media stepped in.  The outrageous political corruption in the South Gate city council elections in 
March, 2001, resulted in a feature story, “The Savage Politics of South Gate,” in the Los Angeles Times 
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Sunday Magazine in which Albert Robles was profiled (Quinones, 2007, pp. 89-90).  That story probably 
marked the beginning of the end of Robles political career. 
 Media oversight took longer in Bell, after all, Robert Rizzo was appointed city manager 
in 1992 and was in office for 18 years.  The referendum that set Bell up as a charter city and made very 
high salaries possible was carried out under the media radar.  And, for several years the astonishing 
salaries being paid to the city manager, the assistant city manager and members of the city council were 
also under the media radar as were a series of unauthorized loans, sharply increased taxes, a car towing 
scam, and so forth.  It was not until Rizzo was arrested for drunk driving and the nearby City of 
Maywood contracted with Bell for police and other services that reporters from the Los Angeles Times 
took an interest in Bell.  Once investigative reporters from the mainline press got on the case, the full 
extent of the Bell corruption scandal was revealed.   With the coverage of the press, various agencies of 
state government, the State Controller John Chaing did an audit, the Los Angeles County District 
Attorney Steve Cooley did an investigation, the State Attorney General, Jerry Brown’s office did an 
investigation.  Although it took a long time for the press to engage city corruption in Bell, once it was on 
the case, the several oversight and accountability agencies of government were not far behind. 
         The era of small town and suburban newspapers is gone and with it the kind of early 
detailed local press coverage that might have unraveled bits of corruption and stood in the way of big 
time corruption.  Will the Bell or South Gate scandals of the future be different in the new world of 
social media? Will local bloggers blow the whistle?  Or, will the new digital free-for-all be more noise 
than it is news?   
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 There is good evidence of forms of civil society in South Gate and Bell, groups of 
neighbors or like-minded residents raising issues, advocating changes, and engaging socially and 
politically.  Some of the groups formed to kick the bums out are still active, particularly BESTA in Bell.  
Such groups act as a form of oversight and accountability. 
 Four years on from the Bell corruption scandal and there is still a bit of tidying-up.  
There were at least 55 law suits over charges of improper termination of employees, seeking the return 
of money from improperly retained law firms, etc.  There are only three or four left unsettled.  City 
audits were three years behind and are now caught up.  Bank accounts and city accounts had not been 
reconciled for some time and are now balanced.  City contracts with employee unions were all out of 
date and have now been renegotiated and are up to date.  In sum, Bell City now appears to be well and 
honestly managed. 
 Bell politics are lively with contested races for city council.  Some BESTA supported 
candidates hold office.  Immigrants and first generation Americans are learning the ways of city 
government.  There is a growing base of trust in city hall.  At the same time there is a vocal and spirited 
political minority claiming that not enough has been changed.  This is good evidence of effective 
democratic accountability. 
 Old issues and challenges remain.  The tax burden on the people of Bell is still 
comparatively high.  Bell lacks a strong commercial tax base and must rely over much on the taxation of 
residences.              
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Summing Up  
   What happened in South Gate and Bell is twenty-first century municipal reform; a 
contemporary version of cleaning up the city and throwing the bums out.  South Gate and Bell 
are stories of vice, the search for virtue, and virtue’s eventual triumph.   
What can be said of Albert Robles?  “South Gate had melted together because of him. 
‘You got to know people you’d never had much contact with, and you became friends . . . . In a 
roundabout way, Albert may have been the best thing that ever happened to us’” (Quinones, 
2007).  In the local politics associated with the election to attempt to recall Albert Robles, a long 
standing local community policing organization of neighborhood leaders and police, Community 
in Action, was mobilized in support of recall.  It turned out that there was strong support for the 
police among neighborhood activists and the police union worked to recall Albert Robles.  
Padres Unidos (Parents United), a group formed earlier to pressure the school district to reduce 
overcrowded classrooms, mobilized to work on the recall.  Coffee klatches sprang up around 
town, people opening their homes and pouring coffee for those supporting recall.  Once 
motivated, the grassroots of civil society proved to be strong. After the recall and after the 
conviction of Albert Robles, Sam Quinones, reflecting on a post-recall festival in South Gate, 
summed it up well:  “. . . It seems to me that when it came to politics, in South Gate at least, 
Mexican immigrants opted for something much different than they were used to.  I wondered 
how other cities would do it, absent a cucuy (boogie man) to unite against.  Still, in the aftermath 
of Albert, this festival had a lot in common with the town:  whites had created them both; 
Mexicans had now rejuvenated them by making them their own” (2007, pp. 115-16). 
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 What can be said of Robert Rizzo and of Bell?  It could be said that the Bell 
scandal had primarily to do with administrative corruption, while the South Gate scandal had 
primarily to do with political corruption.  After Rizzo’s resignation and the recall of the members 
of the Bell city council, the opening for a new city manager was advertised. On July 15, 2011, 
the application deadline closed. Applications were counted up.  They totaled zero (Duggan, 
2012).  Officials from the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) offered 
help.  Partnering with the League of California Cities and the California City Management 
Foundation, ICMA arranged for Ken Hamplian, the retired city manager of San Luis Obispo, to 
step in for 30 days, without compensation.  He was followed by Arne Croce, a retired city 
manager of San Mateo, who agreed to serve for nine months.  Pam Easter, another retired city 
manager stepped in, as a volunteer, to assist Ken Hamplian and then Arne Croce,  Over the next 
few months, as the organization and administration of Bell was put back together, over two 
dozen local government professionals stepped in to help Bell, some of them using accrued 
vacation and sick leave time to volunteer.  By the summer of 2012, Bell was ready for permanent 
administrative leadership.  The new Bell city manager, now in office for more than two years, is 
Doug Willmore, a former chief administrative officer for Salt Lake County, Utah, and briefly the 
city manager of El Segundo, California.  Bell now has a first rate website with wall-to-wall 
transparency, and virtually all of the details of the municipal reform canon.  The city manager’s 
salary is $180,356, for all to see.  
What can be said of the episodes of corruption in Bell’s sister cities?  After reminding us 
that five of the eight Bell and her sister cities cluster had at least one elected official go to prison 
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in the last dozen years, Sam Quinones observes that “each boil of corruption, once lanced, left its 
respective town a little cleaner, more chastened” (Quinones, 2015).    
 
Because we identify with the vulgar ethics perspective, it will have been noticed that we 
have given little attention to public administration ethics scholarship.  We have no quarrel with 
the study of ontology or, for that matter, deontology, or the study of moral idealism or of 
utilitarianism, or claims being made about either dirty hands or many hands, or the ethics of 
regime values, or even the further study of the patriotism of benevolence. All add to the body of 
ethics knowledge. Knowledge of these things helps us to know about goodness. But, as Lewis 
Mainzer (1991) argues, we can study goodness and we can teach about goodness, but can we 
actually teach goodness? He asks this question: Can study, research, and teaching induce moral 
change in ordinary people? 
Mainzer writes thusly: 
Socrates wondered, Who are they, having been inferior people, who have now 
become under your care good and noble? If, so far as one can estimate, churches and 
priests fail as often as not in truly gentling human nature, whether or not they work aided 
by the authority of schools or with heaven or hell in their armament, why should schools 
and professors expect to do better? We may induce a sense of moral exhilaration in the 
classroom, but evil one day insinuates itself in so prosaic a form that there is no time for 
warning. Or one seeming good conflicts with another, or embrace of a partial evil is 
necessary to avoid a worse. . . . Teachers may seek to be moral guides, but we can at best 
be confident of our professorial ability to convey a bit of knowledge.  
Nevertheless, we persist out of faith. 
Whatever one’s sense of the connection between knowing the truth and being 
good, all of us must be uneasy with any supposition that learning philosophy or being 
able to discuss the pros and cons of a basic issue, leads to virtuous action. Following the 
advice given by Mark Lilla twenty-five years ago, when it comes to the practical and 
applied issues of ethics, we should “send the philosophers home,” for their theorizing is 
too abstract. We should admit that moral education would take place, much as it always 
has, through examples, through families, and even a bit of indoctrination. (1991, 4–5) 
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Instead, Mainzer suggests vulgar ethics or, put more gently, common ethics or ordinary 
ethics. This is the public administration ethics of putting rules, regulations, and red tape in place 
to keep elected city officials and appointed city bureaucrats from behaving badly. This can be 
done without a discourse on Hobbes and his philosophy of human nature. This is the public 
administration ethics of operating trust-based relational contracting systems without a discussion 
of Rousseau and his philosophy of human nature. This is not the disembodied consideration of 
public morality. It is, instead, the fully contextualized application of policies, procedures, and so 
forth, set out earlier in the description of the canon of local government reform ethics. developed 
in the government reform era. And it is the reason that an understanding of the contextual 
characteristics of the present era of governance and the extended state is essential to the building 
of a public administration ethic suited to it. 
Vulgar ethics suggests the use of ordinary cases, examples, or models, rather than 
extraordinary cases.  Those who study ethics will have found in these remarks a decided 
emphasis on institutional and organizational forms, on rules and regulations, on organizational 
behavior. Put another way, we have purposely chosen not to emphasize individual moral and 
ethical choice and not to consider those forms of public administration ethics that rest on 
individual moral choice claims. This is out of our conviction that most public administrators will, 
most of the time, make good moral choices. For those tempted to be unethical, the Albert Robles 
and Robert Rizzos of the world, there must be policies, rules, regulations, oversight, audits, and 
other forms of institutional arrangements to help them be virtuous.  And even then they may not 
work.  After all, it is vice that makes virtue precious. 
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